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disregard the fact of learning being a cumulative process by relying on rather poor proxies for 
instructional time.  Highschool ninth graders from the OECD Programme of International 
Student Assessment (PISA-E) tests’ bottom percentiles bene.t most from extra-instructional 
time measured in cumulated form from first up to ninth grade. Besides total instructional time 
exposure, we identify eight further social environment and institutional variables with robust 
impact on student performance. In contrast to instructional time hardly any of these factors 
can be affected by policy in the short run. 
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This paper is in the tradition of the seminal study by Card and Krueger (1992) in
that it relies on cross-state variation in education inputs and institutions. There is a
continuing debate on whether schooling resources have a bearing on student outcomes
(Krueger 2003; Hanushek 2003, 2004, 2006a). Todd and Wolpin (2003) see econometric
misspeci￿cation and failure to account for major determinants of student achievement
as the central problem in correctly identifying the relationship. Recently, a little studied
input receives growing attention: In Coates (2003), Eren and Millimet (2007), Marcotte
(2007), Marcotte and Hemelt (2008), and Lavy (2010) the focus is on instructional time
by subject.
Our study is unique in using data of instructional time cumulated from all academic
years leading up to the test date in each of the two subjects math and reading. We rely on
cross-state variation in Germany, where 16 states share the same cultural and legal system
but pursue di⁄erent education policies (Schulte 2004). The fact that German states have
responsibility for both primary and secondary education, makes our data particularly
suited to analyze the impact cumulative instruction has on student achievements. As
for the educational instruction￿ performance relationship, Marcotte (2007) and Marcotte
and Hemelt (2008) are the only studies that focus on and consider the cumulative nature
of instruction as determinant of student performance. They make use of intra-state
school level and snowfall (unscheduled closings) data for students in grades 3, 5 and
8 in Maryland. Their approximation of a cumulated e⁄ect is based on the hypothesis
that the lower the grade, the less room exists for making up and the higher the relative
weight of lost instruction. Therefore, the instructional time shortfall e⁄ect decreases
with grade. However, this cumulated e⁄ect is of second order as only measures of total
snowfall in the academic year of the test date (Marcotte 2007) or in the preceding 3 years
(Marcotte and Hemelt 2008) are considered. Coates (2003) relying on district-level data
for Illinois and considering uncumulated daily instruction in third grade classes, ￿nds
that a 10 percent increase in mathematics instruction per week raises the average math
score by about 0.4 percent. Similar small e⁄ects are found for English instruction. Eren
and Millimet (2007) analyze the joint e⁄ect the daily number of class periods and the
average class length (in minutes) has on cognitive test results of US public schools 10th
graders (National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988). Only uncumulated 10th grade
instructional conditions are considered. Their reform-type ￿nding is that changing the
2system from one with ￿ 6 daily classes lasting ￿ 51 minutes to another one with seven
45-minutes classes increases test scores by 2 percent.
In sociology of education, sociolinguistics, and the neurosciences, a recent body of lit-
erature is concerned with the structured processing of knowledge ascribing it to di⁄erent
modes of learning. An essential element of these modes is to conceptualize knowledge-
building through cumulative learning. Accordingly, learning is found to be a cumulative
process during which new knowledge is dependent and based on a precedingly acquired
stock of knowledge; see, among others, Freebody et al. (2008), Maton (2009), and Yew
et al. (2011). Yet, to the present, empirical work in the economics of education literature
does not take these ￿ndings into account and relies on rather poor measures of instruc-
tional time as independent variables. This is not to say that the relevance of current
and past inputs and the de￿ciencies of approaches abstracting from input histories is
not recognized in the literature (Card and Krueger 1996, Todd and Wolpin 2003). It is
simply and mostly due to data limitations not done. Typically, estimates are based on
instructional time proxies such as students￿self-reported hours of instruction per week as
they relate to the respective test year. Todd and Wolpin (2003) refer to these measures
as ￿contemporaneous inputs.￿Given insights from sociology and neuro-sciences or, in
general, from ￿multidisciplinary empirical literature studies￿(Todd and Wolpin 2003, p.
F3), however, a cumulative measure such as cumulated instructional time (henceforth,
CIT) from ￿rst grade to test year for each observed cohort is required. This becomes all
the more obvious if we look at an arbitrarily chosen mathematics sample task from PISA
(OECD 2009, p. 125) that reads as follows:
Mathematics Unit 27: A result of global warming is that the ice of some glaciers is
melting. Twelve years after the ice disappears, tiny plants, called lichen, start to grow
on the rocks. Each lichen grows approximately in the shape of a circle. The relationship
between the diameter of this circle and the age of the lichen can be approximated with the
formula:
d = 7:0 ￿
p
(t ￿ 12) for t ￿ 12;
where d represents the diameter of the lichen in millimetres, and t represents the number
of years after the ice has disappeared.
In the two questions that followed students are asked to calculate (Q1) the diameter
of the lichen, 16 years after the ice disappeared and (Q2) the number of years that
the ice disappeared at a spot, where the diameter of some lichen is found to be 35
3millimetres. Most obviously (Q1) and (Q2) can be answered based on knowledge on
subtracting, multiplying, taking roots, and the technique of substitution or trial and
error that students acquired over several years starting from the very ￿rst grade. These
skills might have barely something to do with instruction in the ninth grade.
The vast majority of studies analyzing data from international student assessments
like PISA or TIMSS (Third International Math and Science Study) only considers instruc-
tional time at the relevant grade level as an explanatory for test performance. Usually,
these ￿snap-shot￿ -type measures of instructional time are drawn either from students￿
self-reporting or from test add-ons such as principals￿questionnaires as, for example, in
Baker et al. (2004), Lavy (2010), and W￿ssmann (2010). Given the serious error-in-
variables problem contained in these measures, it does not come as a surprise that their
impact on student test scores is mostly estimated as not statistically di⁄erent from zero
(as, for example, in W￿ssmann 2010). Besides studies that use snap-shot query-based
measures, there are few studies that rely on the length of a school day and/or the length
of a school year to proxy instructional time as input in an education production or more
general Mincer-type framework (Dewey et al. 2000, Lee and Barro 2001, Pischke 2007).
Two exceptional studies that try to consider, at least, partially the cumulative nature of
learning are Afonso and St. Aubyn (2006) and Moser and Angelone (2009). The ￿rst of
these studies makes use of a variable ￿intended instruction time in public institutions in
hours per year for the 12 to 14-year-olds￿cumulated for the three years preceding the
PISA 2003 tests for 25 di⁄erent countries. Similarly, Moser and Angelone (2009) also
partially accumulate instructional time in Swiss cantons from seventh to ninth grade to
estimate its impact on PISA 2006 scores. Again, as expected given the rough approxi-
mation of total instructional time for both studies there is no clear-cut evidence for the
input￿ achievement relationship. Afonso and St. Aubyn (2006) ￿nd no signi￿cant evi-
dence. The evidence reported in Moser and Angelone (2009) is mixed and depends on
the subject studied. A signi￿cant positive association is found for instructional time and
test scores in math.
Our study contributes along two lines to the literature. First, it addresses the outlined
serious error-in-variables problem and implied shortcoming in empirical work on educa-
tion inputs and outcomes measured by international student test scores by using data
on total instructional time that students were exposed to from ￿rst to ninth (i.e. test
date) grade by subject. Secondly, besides quantifying the actual impact of cumulative
instructional time on PISA test scores, we address model uncertainty and robustness,
4which are also issues that are widely ignored in the literature, by using extreme bound
analysis (EBA) techniques for our estimates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines our data and used
methods. Section 3 reports and discusses our ￿ndings. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 Data and methodology
2.1 Data
Data on student achievement are drawn from the national extension of the PISA studies
in 2000, 2003, 2006 (PISA-E) and from the ￿rst so-called ￿L￿ndervergleich 2009,￿that is,
the follow-up study of PISA-E. PISA as well as the L￿ndervergleich test representative
samples of 15-year-old students in math, science and reading literacy (in 2003 also in
problem solving ￿in 2009, exclusively in reading and English). PISA-E used the same
tests as the international PISA study. Apart from high schools, profound variation in the
tracking and tracking systems among the remaining school types makes a comparison of
student achievement across German states for these types of schools virtually impossible
(Prenzel et al. 2008). Some of the remaining school types actually not even exist in
each German state. This system heterogeneity is not an issue for high schools, on which
we will focus in the following. The PISA-E test￿ s sample size is several times the one
of the international tests comprising two overlapping samples of 15-year-olds and ninth
graders. Each sample covers about 40,000 students made of state samples ranging from
1,600 to 5,000 students for the 16 German federal states. Since German con￿dentiality
requirements preclude the use of student-level data across states, one is restricted to use
pooled state-level data.1 German states mean performance is measured on a standardized
scale: Just like for any PISA and/or PISA-E participating OECD country, state or
province, scores for each subject and year are centered to an OECD mean of 500 and a
standard deviation of 100. All our regressions include dummy variables for year and test
subject, respectively.
Our data on instructional time are compiled from the respective state by-laws, taking
1Pooling is a common practice in the literature. An example for pooling subjects is Eren and
Millimet (2007). Pooling German states and merging in data on aggregate countries is done in
W￿ssmann (2010). Coates (2003) also considers pooling three test years.
5into account amendments of ordinances, correcting for festivities and celebrations, such
as state-wide holidays and any changes over time in these regulations for the period of
observation. We followed the respective PISA cohorts from ￿rst to ninth grade. First to
fourth grade concerns elementary school, ￿fth to ninth grade concerns high school (re-
ferred to as ￿Gymnasium￿in German). For each of the 16 states, we construct an annual
instructional time variable that is summed up to CIT. The data used in the construction
of the variable come from several sources. The major part is drawn from administrative
regulations, which can be found in o¢ cial ministerial and/or school administration docu-
ments or in law and ordinance gazettes of the states. For some federal states, information
on instructional time is given in special by-laws, so-called ￿Stundentafelverordnungen,￿
as well as in regulations and mandates concerning training, examination and school rules
such as the Bavarian ￿Volksschulordnung (VSO)￿for elementary schools and the ￿Gym-
nasialschulordnung (GSO)￿ for high schools. In case of doubt and missing data, we
obtained the information from the respective ministry of education and cultural a⁄airs.
Data on weighting schemes for a di⁄erent intra-state distribution of teaching focus at
the high school level (natural sciences, modern languages, math, etc.) is drawn from the
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Figure 2. Math and reading scores across states; PISA-E cohorts 2000/03/06/09
As reliable data on CIT, constructed according to the strategy sketched above, cannot
be obtained for all test subjects, we restrict our analysis to math and reading. We should
also be clear about the point that we do not consider unscheduled shortfall, homework,
individual tutoring or private study taken before or after school. In sum, we comprise
total curricular hours of the four test cohorts accumulated from year of primary school
enrollment (1991/92, 1994/95, 1997/1998, 2000/2001) to test year (2000, 2003, 2006,
2009).
Pooling PISA-E and L￿ndervergleich data for math and reading over states, tested
subjects (math, reading), and cohorts allows us to rely on a sample of 112 observations.2
As can be seen from Figure 1 and Figure 2,3 German states substantially di⁄er both in
test scores and cumulative instruction by subject. For the distributions shown in Figure
1 and Figure 2, there are two central sources of variation: changes over the considered
216 states, two subjects (math and reading) for three cohorts plus reading for the test cohort
of 2009 amounts to 16￿2￿3+16 = 112. It is frequently claimed that studies relying on data
at the level of states or districts su⁄er from an aggregation bias. Coates (2003) argues that
the profession has not yet reached a consensus on whether such bias tends to produce spurious
resource e⁄ects or not. According to W￿ssmann (2010) aggregation bias is not an issue in the
case of marginal e⁄ects estimated using German state-level data.
3The following abbreviations are used: Berlin (BE), Brandenburg (BR), Baden-Wurttemberg
(BW), Bavaria (BY), Bremen (HB), Hamburg (HH), Hesse (HE), Mecklenburg-West Pomerania
(MP), Lower Saxony (NI), North Rhine-Westphalia (NW), Rhineland-Palatinate (RP), Saar-
land (SA), Schleswig-Holstein (SH), Saxony (SN), Saxony-Anhalt (ST), Thuringia (TH).
7four waves and across the two subjects. Aggregated over states the distributions behind
these two sources are shown in ￿rst and second schedule of Figure 3 and Figure 4,
respectively. In order to check, whether it actually makes a di⁄erence to consider CIT, we
also compared the snap-shot (i.e. only test year concerning) ￿instruction time￿variable
used in W￿ssmann (2010, Table 2, p. 241, Table A.1, p. 266) for PISA-E 2003 and
subject math4 with our corresponding cumulative measure. The correlation is statistically
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Figure 4. PISA-E test scores state-means distributions
2.2 Baseline estimates
To analyze the impact of CIT on students￿test performance we rely on empirical models
close to the ones common in the literature on education ￿ or more speci￿cally on cognitive
achievement￿ production functions. See, among others, Hanushek (2002), Todd and
4The variable is constructed based on the PISA 2003 student questionnaire, in particular,
on Q35b, Section F: Your mathematics classes. It reads as follows: ￿In the last full week you
were in school, how many class periods did you spend in mathematics?￿(OECD 2003, p. 24).
8Wolpin (2003), Fuchs and W￿ssmann (2007), and W￿ssman (2003, 2010). Our baseline
speci￿cations are standard in the sense that we consider besides our central regressor
(CIT) also sets of control variables that include measures of social environment and
institutional features at the state level.
Table 1. Baseline estimates: PISA-E 2000, 2003, 2006













Included set of controls
a) Economic x x x
b) Social x x
c) Educational x
N obs 96 96 96
Adj. R-Squ. (percent) 63.63 74.87 69.87



















Note: Estimates include subject and year dummies; ￿, ￿￿, ￿￿￿ denotes signi￿cance at 10, 5,
1% level, respectively; p-values in parentheses; controls de￿ned in text (and Appendix B).
Table 2. Baseline estimates: PISA-E 2000, 2003, 2006, L￿ndervergleich 2009













Included set of controls
a) Economic x x x
b) Social x x
c) Educational x
N obs 112 112 112
Adj. R-Squ. (percent) 62.35 64.98 71.61



















Note: Estimates include subject and year dummies; ￿, ￿￿, ￿￿￿ denotes signi￿cance at 10, 5,
1% level, respectively; p-values in parentheses; controls de￿ned in text (and Appendix B).
9Concretely, in order to get a ￿rst assessment of the relationship, we estimate the
following speci￿cations




j=1￿jXg;jit + "it; (1)
where Sit denotes test scores; index i and t refer to state and test period, respectively. We
consider up to three sets of control variables, i.e., Xg=1;:::;Xg=3, consisting of k1 = 6 eco-
nomic and political economy variables, k2 = 8 social environment and socio-demographic
variables, and k3 = 9 education policy and institutional variables, respectively. The max-
imum magnitude of conditioning variables amounts to k1+k2+k3 = 23. Set X1 (economic
controls) comprises conservative party shares of governments (Cons), per capita (p.c.)
public indebtedness (Debt), p.c. disposable income (Disp), population densities (Dens),
unemployment rates (Unemp), and p.c. GDP (GDP) ￿gures. Set X2 (social controls)
consists of data on last and ￿rst cohorts experiencing secondary school fees (Fee, Fee2),
female employment rates (Fem), shares of foreign population (For), segregation measured
by the share of 15-year-olds attending high school (Seg), shares of students with migra-
tion background (Mig), and dummies for East Germany (East) and city-state (City).
Finally, set X3 (education controls) considers secondary school years to ￿nal grade, i.e.,
either 8 or 9 years track (G9), average class sizes, student-teacher-ratios, instructional
hours per teacher, and shares of part-time teachers in elementary school (CS1, ST1, HT1,
PT1) and in secondary I (CS2, ST2, HT2, PT2), respectively. For further detail and
sources of variables see Appendix B. A brief summary on how these variables might a⁄ect
student test scores is given in Appendix B.
Controlling for state ￿xed e⁄ects ￿i addresses the quali￿cation of unobserved het-
erogeneity across states. In particular, this concerns such unobservables as pedagogical
quality, performance, and e⁄ectiveness of teachers across states (Hanushek 2006b) as
well as di⁄erences in the quality of educating teachers. It also implies the quality of
text books, instructional methods and materials, and the administration and organiza-
tion of curricula. For all these dimensions each German state has its own choice and
responsibility. As can be seen from the respective ￿rst three (common constant model)
and last three columns of estimates shown in Table 1 and Table 2, a signi￿cant positive
e⁄ect from CIT on test scores is robust to the inclusion of state ￿xed e⁄ects. In fact,
our estimates controlling for ￿xed e⁄ects do not markedly di⁄er from the ones obtained
from regressions without considering state e⁄ects. In speci￿cation (1), we follow the most
recent cross-country study by Lavy (2010) in allowing for concavity in the functional re-
10lationship f (￿) between student performance and CIT. As can be seen from the estimates
reported in Table 1 and Table 2, this more ￿ exible speci￿cation accords with the data,
although less than ten percent of cases lie to the right of the implied upper turning point
(Figure 5). For the remaining vast majority of data points in the scatter diagram, the
relationship between CIT and test scores is close to linear. As Figure 5 is based on the
estimates reported in the last three columns of Table 2, including state ￿xed e⁄ects, it
does not show ordinate values. Hence, we interpret it only qualitatively as lending sup-
port to a weakly concave, nearly linear relationship. In the estimates reported in Table
1, we abstracted from using data from the L￿ndervergleich 2009, which in contrast to
the preceding PISA-E tests did not test math skills of students. Again, the results are
qualitatively not sensitive to the inclusion of the 2009 (reading) scores (Table 2). We
leave all further quantitative interpretation of estimates for section 3, reporting results
from our sensitivity analysis of the bearing CIT has on student test performance. In the
following, we outline how we achieve robustness by addressing model uncertainty in an
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Figure 5. Relationship between CIT and test scores
2.3 Addressing model uncertainty: methodology
In order to address model uncertainty, we subject our empirical model to an extreme
bounds analysis (EBA) as originally suggested by Leamer (1983, 1985) and Levine and
Renelt (1992) and extended and modi￿ed by Granger and Uhlig (1990) and Sala-i-Martin
(1997). The use of EBA techniques is fairly popular in the empirics of economic growth
11literature. However, its use is not limited to growth regressions. For recent applications
in other contexts see Sturm et al. (2005) and Mossa (2009). Yet, we are not aware of
an EBA application in the area of education production function estimates. In general,
EBA does not include the use of state (or country) ￿xed e⁄ects to take account of
unobserved heterogeneity. In fact, in the present context the use of state ￿xed e⁄ects
implies that di⁄erent average student PISA test scores between states are not explained
but represented by dummy variables. Thus, all that can be explained by these regressions
are reactions of test scores over time (see, in a similar context, Kirchg￿ssner 2011, p. 17),
which show a comparatively lower variation than the distribution of scores across states.
See the distributions shown in Figure 2 as opposed to the ones shown in the ￿rst diagram
of Figure 4. Following this argumentation and adhering to the EBA practice in the
literature, we abstract from the inclusion of state dummies as well as from nonlinear
speci￿cations. Both modi￿cations have shown to be not critical for an assessment of the
relationship between CIT and student test scores (section 2.2).
Hence, our general EBA speci￿cation reads




k=1￿kZkit + ￿it; (2)
where Vj represents a set of important variables included in every regression. It contains
a dummy for subject math as well as dummy variables identifying the respective year.
Zk is a set of three up to eleven out of 23 possible conditioning variables (section 2.2),
where the minimum number of such conditioners (= 3) follows the suggestion in Levine
and Renelt (1992). To identify di⁄erences between the impact of CIT on average PISA-E
test scores and of CIT on scores of top and bottom percentile students of each cohort,
we also consider TopX% and BotX% as dependent variables. To check for robustness,
the strategy is to consider all possible M = n!=(k!(n￿k)!) regression models that can be
estimated by taking combinations of k out of the 23 Z-variables, that is, 1;771 models for
k = 3 up to 1;352;078 models for k = 11. For this elaborated sensitivity analysis we also
address for every single regression in the procedure possible problems of multicollinearity
by dropping models with a variance in￿ ation factor (VIF) for the exogenous at stake
exceeding a value of four.5
As proposed by Levine and Renelt (1992), so-called ￿extreme bounds￿of estimates
5A V IFj for some exogenous variable xj is de￿ned as V IFj = 1=(1 ￿ R2
j), where goodness-
of-￿t measure R2
j refers to a regression of xj on all other independent variables in the respective
model. For zero collinearity V IFj takes on a value of one.
12can be used to check whether a variable like CITit in eq. (2) is fragile or robust. They are
made of lower and upper bound. The former is de￿ned as the lowest estimated value for
￿M minus two standard deviations, the latter as the highest estimated value for ￿M plus
two standard deviations. If lower and upper extreme bound for estimated ￿ coe¢ cients
show the same sign, the explanatory variable at stake is said to be robustly related to
the dependent variable.
A critical aspect of EBA-techniques in their original version proposed by Leamer
(1983) and Levine and Renelt (1992) is that extreme bounds may be resultant from
models that are unreasonable in terms of a corresponding relatively low R2 statistics.
A modi￿ed EBA procedure addressing this problem is suggested by Granger and Uhlig
(1990). Their idea is to consider only those ￿M estimates stemming from models that
reach R2 statistics corresponding to a certain percentage of the R2
max of all M estimated
models, taking into account the goodness-of-￿t R2
min of the basic model (leaving out
the control for conditioning variables, i.e.,
Xm
k=1￿kZki). This approach is referred to as
￿reasonable extreme bounds analysis￿(REBA) in the literature. For model speci￿cations
with R2-values equal to or greater than
R
2





where 0 < ￿ < 1 and for small ￿-values, we consider corresponding speci￿cations as being
￿reasonable￿speci￿cations as they are not too far o⁄ from the ￿best￿model ￿ of the M
considered ones￿in terms of goodness-of-￿t as measured by the adjusted R2.
Sala-i-Martin (1997) argues that a single regression for which the sign of the coe¢ cient
￿ changes or becomes insigni￿cant su¢ ces according to original EBA or REBA standards
that a variable is identi￿ed to be non-robust. He assesses this procedure as a too hard to
pass test for almost any variable at stake: ￿if the distribution of the parameter of interest
has some positive and some negative support, then one is bound to ￿nd one regression for
which the estimated coe¢ cient changes signs if enough regressions are run￿(Sala-i-Martin
1997, p. 179). This insight led Sala-i-Martin to introduce a newly modi￿ed approach
by moving away from the extreme test and instead assigning some level of con￿dence by
looking at the entire distribution of the estimators of ￿M. For each of the M estimated
models the likelihood LM, the point estimates ￿M, and the standard deviation ￿M are
calculated. They are used to construct the mean estimate of ￿ and the average variance















Once the mean and the variance of the distribution of ￿, assumed to be normal,6 are
known, the cumulative distribution function (CDF) can be calculated using the standard
normal distribution. The level of con￿dence for the variable of interest is de￿ned as the
larger of the two areas under the probability density function (PDF) left and right from
zero.7 In order to be as comprehensive as possible, we apply all three methods, that is,
standard EBA, REBA, and EBA in the modi￿ed version of Sala-i-Martin (1997), hence-
forth SiM-EBA. Primarily this is done to check the robustness of the association between
CIT and PISA scores, letting k vary between 3 and 11. Going beyond this primary
sensitivity analysis, we also scrutinize the impact of the other 23 potential explanatories
(see Appendix B for detail) on our measure of cognitive achievement Sit relying on the
considered portfolio of EBA-techniques.
3 Results
3.1 Cumulative instructional time
Results for all three EBA methods outlined above are reported for three di⁄erent (max-
imum) numbers of variables sampled into the conditioning set, i.e., for k = 3;k = 5,
and k = 11, in Table A.3, Table A.4, and Table A.5 of Appendix A, respectively. In
the interpretation of these ￿ndings, we will follow Sala-i-Martin and focus on the entire
distribution (SiM-EBA) and only discuss results from the other two procedures if they
deviate from the SiM-EBA based ￿nding. For all used dependent variables, CIT shows
a positive signi￿cant impact on scores that is robust if we consider di⁄erent subperiods,
even if we apply CDF(0) > 0:95 as more strict criterion of robustness. A ￿rst point to
note is that variation in k does not qualitatively alter our results as can be seen from
Table A.3 to A.5 in Appendix A. Figures 6 to 8 make the point by showing the respective
6The normality assumption is justi￿ed on the grounds of the central limit theorem as can be
seen from Figures 5 to 7.
7We follow Sala-i-Martin (1997) by referring to the larger of the two areas as ￿CDF(0)￿
irrespective of whether the area lies actually above or below zero.
14distribution of estimated ￿ coe¢ cients for di⁄erent k (the black line drawn through the
respective diagram shows the kernel density, while the grey line depicts the normal PDF
as a reference case). The distributions virtually have the same mean, while the variance,
of course, decreases with k and the number of estimated models M. CDF(0) remains
above a value of 0.95 going from k = 11 to k = 3, that is, narrowing the number of
variables contained in the conditioning set. This suggests for the sake of e¢ ciency, that
is, for the sake of estimating rather 33,649 (k = 5) than 1.35 million (k = 11) models
for di⁄erent test waves or subsets of pooled waves (Table 3), to concentrate the further
analysis on k = 5. Table 3 reports these results for all students￿scores as well as for
the top-5% and top-10% and the bottom-5% and bottom-10% of students in terms of
test scores. Since for L￿ndervergleich 2009 no score data by percentile is available our
analysis for bottom-/top-end students is restricted to the PISA-E waves 2000, 2003, and
2006. For the overall test scores as dependent, we consider besides the total pool also
a corresponding data set restricted to the year 2000 only and one that leaves out the
L￿ndervergleich 2009, when math has not been tested. The year 2K test sub-sample
captures the e⁄ect of the ￿rst year in which the test was conducted. In this sense, it can
be seen as relatively free from e⁄ects induced by policies that the states started in the
aftermath of the ￿rst test. This is due to the fact that results from the PISA-E 2000 tests
were widely published and extensively discussed in the media and in political debates
(Tillmann et al. 2008, P￿tz 2008). As can be seen from Table 3, we also considered total
and sub-set sample separately for math and reading sub-samples. The fourth column of
Table 3 displays the unweighted mean of ￿M for M = 33;649: Multiplying these ￿gures
with an average of 360 (= 40￿9) school weeks over the nine years from ￿rst grade to test
date, we can calculate the approximate e⁄ect of a policy corresponding to one additional
hour of instructional time per week over the total learning period. It is shown in the
￿fth column of Table 3. Finally, the last column in Table 3 reports CDF(0) values from
applying the SiM-EBA method. As can be seen from the third line of results displayed
in Table 3, the above described stylized policy e⁄ect of CIT on scores amounts to siz-
able 11.59 test-score points or roughly 12 percent of an international standard deviation.
Dropping the L￿ndervergleich 2009 data the e⁄ect increases to more than 13 percent.
The largest average impact of a one hour per week increase policy is calculated, when
one restricts the sample to the ￿rst year when German states ran the OECD PISA test
for the ￿rst time, i.e. for PISA-E 2000. It amounts to nearly 17 percent of an inter-
national standard deviation. For the sub-samples separating subjects, we ￿nd that the
15e⁄ect is particularly pronounced for math (> 16 percent) but still sizable, that is, above
12 percent of an international standard deviation, for reading. Looking at upper and
lower percentiles of test scores, we ￿nd that all students would bene￿t from an increase
in CIT. The CIT￿ score relationship is, however, more pronounced for the bottom-end
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Figure 6. Distribution of estimated betas for
SiM EBA: k = 3, pool: 00/03/06/09, math/reading
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Figure 7. Distribution of estimated betas for
SiM EBA: k = 5, pool: 00/03/06/09, math/reading
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Figure 8. Distribution of estimated betas for
SiM EBA: k = 11, pool: 00/03/06/09, math/reading
M = 1;352;078 models, N = 112 observations
To get an impression of what 16 percent of an international standard deviation is
actually to mean, consider the following experiment of thought: Under the assumption
that the policy of increasing the instructional time by one additional hour per week over
the total learning period has a similar impact on scores for other secondary school types
as it has for high schools, we can calculate the consequences in the rankings, interpreting
German states ￿as a microcosm for OECD countries￿(W￿ssmann 2010). Take OECD
PISA 2006, in which German students ranked 14th in math compared to the other OECD
test participating countries; see Table A.7 in Appendix A. An increase by 16 percent of
the standard deviation (normed to 100) of this test would correspond to running up
six ranks up to rank 8. In contrast, cutting CIT down by one hour per week would
correspond to a drop in the ranking down to rank 24. Similar e⁄ects can be calculated
for reading.
All results reported in Table 3 are robust in the sense of Sala-i-Martin (1997).8 CDF(0)
values range between 0.9736 to 0.9999. As can be seen from detailed Tables A.3, A.4,
and A.5 in Appendix A, virtually all values for lower and upper bounds show positive
signs, con￿rming the highly robust positive e⁄ect of CIT on PISA test-scores.
8Re-running our estimates relying on a snap-shot measure like the ones discussed in the
introduction and used, for example, by W￿ssmann (2010), throughout generates results that
are not robust (￿fragile￿ ) in the sense of any conventional EBA-criterion (EBA, REBA, SiM-
EBA). Results are available on request from the authors.
17Table 3. Impact of CIT on PISA-E tets-scores: SiM-EBA (k = 5; Z = 23)
Dependent Test year Test subject Beta (mean) Policy e⁄ect CDF(0)
Score 2000 math/reading 0.0468 16.87 0.9736
Score 00/03/06 math/reading 0.0364 13.12 0.9992
Score 00/03/06/09 math/reading 0.0321 11.59 0.9976
Score 00/03/06/09 reading 0.0340 12.27 0.9987
Score 00/03/06 reading 0.0412 14.84 0.9996
Score 00/03/06 math 0.0456 16.44 0.9999
Bot5% 00/03/06 math/reading 0.0444 16.00 0.9960
Bot10% 00/03/06 math/reading 0.0421 15.17 0.9980
Top10% 00/03/06 math/reading 0.0323 11.63 0.9961
Top5% 00/03/06 math/reading 0.0266 9.57 0.9790
Note: Policy e⁄ect is one additional hour of CIT per week over total learning period.
3.2 Other robust determinants of cognitive achievement
In order to analyze which of the remaining 23 available explanatories (see Appendix B
for detail) have a robust impact on test scores, we rely on the same portfolio of EBA-
techniques as for CIT in the preceding paragraphs. Table 4 below summarizes the results
for this exercise reported in detail in Table A.6, for which we set k = 3 (M = 1;771)9
and consider the 00/03/06/09￿ math/reading pool with N = 112 observations for each of
the M estimated models. As central criterion of robustness we again apply the modi￿ed
SiM-EBA criterion, i.e. CDF(0) > 0.95.10
At the federal state level, public indebtedness (Debt), disposable income (Disp), pop-
ulation density (Dens), and the unemployment rate (Unemp), each measured for the year
corresponding to the respective PISA-E test-year, as well as a dummy for East German
states (East) are found to be robustly and negatively associated with test scores accord-
ing to the modi￿ed SiM-EBA criterion. Drawn from the respective PISA cohort data,
also the share of 15 years old students with migrational background (Mig) is identi￿ed as
9As for CIT, results are qualitatively una⁄ected by setting k = 5 (M = 33;649).
10Note, applying the less strict CDF(0) > 0.90 instead, as originally proposed in Sala-i-
Martin (1997), also identi￿es variables average class size in elementary schools (CS1), average
instructional hours per teacher in elementary schools (HT1) and segregation (SEG) as robust
determinants of student achievement.
18robust negative correlate with scores. By this standard robust education policy variables
are the number of secondary school years to exit exam (G9) and average class size in
secondary I (CS2).
Table 4. Robust and weakly robust determinants of PISA-E test-scores besides CIT
SiM-EBA (k = 3, Z = 23)
Category Variable Beta (mean) CDF(0)




Social environment Mig -0.501y 0.988
East -8.931y 0.999
Education policy G9 -5.770y 0.984
CS2 -0.335y 0.979
Note: ySiM-EBA, REBA: robust, standard EBA: fragile
yySiM-EBA: robust; standard EBA, REBA: fragile
The only variable that measures up to CIT with regard to meeting all robustness cri-
teria of the considered portfolio of EBA-techniques is public indebtedness per inhabitant.
It proxies the cost e⁄ectiveness of incumbent and former governments of the respective
state. In terms of size, the estimated average coe¢ cient (< 0) of the dummy for an East
German state (East) stands out. This is, in particular, due to the poor performance
of students from the East German state of Brandenburg (BR) as well as to the below
national average achievement in terms of math and reading test scores of the two East
German states Mecklenburg-West Pomerania (MP) and Saxony-Anhalt (ST); see Figure
2. It is also these states of the ￿ve East German ones that are known for their notori-
ously unsound economic and demographic status characterized by a substantial number
of movers to the Western states in the decades following German uni￿cation. The average
negative impact of the institutional grade con￿guration variable G9 on test scores also is
relatively sizable.11 The e⁄ect is negative and amounts to about six percent of an inter-
national standard deviation. It is straightforward to attribute this e⁄ect to di⁄erences in
11Variable G9 is a dummy that takes on a value of one if the number of secondary school years
to ￿nal grade, that is, to Abitur, the German A-level equivalent, is nine as opposed to eight
years. It is up to each state￿ s discretionary education policy to set this length. East German
states traditionally practice an eight years system.
19the density of curricula: Students might be comparatively more advanced in math and
reading skills in a system, where the ￿nal exit exam takes place three rather than four
years after the PISA test date. State-level population densities, unemployment rates, and
shares of students with migration background show the expected sign (see Appendix B),
though being less strongly associated with lower test scores in terms of size of estimated
coe¢ cients. Another education policy variable that is robust according to the modi￿ed
SiM-EBA criterion is average class size in secondary I (CS2). A decrease of CS2 by one
student over the nine years from enrollment (￿rst grade) to test year (ninth grade) is
robustly associated, however, with only a minor increase of 0.335 points or 0.335 percent
of an international standard deviation. In sum, the e⁄ect of (education) policy variables
is either most probably resultant from PISA tests being not adjusted to di⁄erences in
curricula or is quite small in size compared to the policy e⁄ect of increasing CIT. The only
counter-intuitive and weakest, in terms of size, e⁄ect is the negative average coe¢ cient
for disposable income.
A ￿nal caveat concerns the above interpretation of results reported in Table 4: Apart
from public indebtedness per inhabitant and CIT all other 22 considered determinants
of student achievement are either not robust or are fragile, at least, according to one
criterion in the used portfolio of EBA-procedures. Hence, they have both some positive
and some negative support (Table A.6).
4 Conclusion
Econometric misspeci￿cation and failure to account for major determinants of student
achievement represent the central problem in correctly identifying the school inputs￿
student achievement relationship (Todd and Wolpin 2003). By relying on a portfolio
of extreme bounds analysis techniques as well as a newly compiled cross-state dataset
on cumulative instructional time from ￿rst grade to ninth (i.e., OECD PISA-test date)
grade for German states, we addressed two fundamental shortcomings in the literature:
A serious error-in-variables problem due to using poor proxies of instructional time and
the widely ignored issue of model uncertainty. We ￿nd that instructional time by sub-
ject, measured in cumulative terms, is a highly robust determinant of student cognitive
achievement. This ￿nding is insensitive to the inclusion of state ￿xed e⁄ects and to
sub-set choices of tests. It is robust according to all conventional EBA-standards.
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Table A.1. Summary statistics of PISA test scores Sit and cumulated instructional time CITit 
 
Sample Math/  reading Math only Reading only
Variable      Sit     CITit     Sit     CITit     Sit     CITit
 
Mean   577.2 1665.8 580..9 1575.1 574.5 1733.7
Max   613 2015.4 613 1712 598 2015.4
Min   547 1407.8 547 1407.8 547 1556.4
Range   66 607.6 66 304.2 51 459.0
Std. dev.   13.8 120.4 14.9 69.5 12.4 104.9
Median 578 1645.1 581.5 1584.0 576 1713.5






Table A.2. Basic and full model: Variants by dependent, test cohorts (Year), and tested subjects (Subjects) 
 
 
Note:  All regressions include dummies for respective test subject (math, reading) and test year (2000, 2003, 2006, 2009). 
 Basic  model  includes  CIT as sole regressor, full model considers all 23 variables listed below. 




 Dependent  Year(s)   Subjects    Basic  Full 
















                        
1  Score  00-09 math/reading  112  0.02893 2.3  25.99  10.41  0.01836 5.9  70.54  6.61 
 
2  Score  00 math/reading  32  0.05182  4.6 7.44  18.66 
 
 
insufficient degrees of freedom (DF) 
3  Score  00-06 math/reading 96 0.03323 1.6  24.43  11.96 
 
0.02360 4.2  67.89  8.50 
4  Score  00-09 reading 64  0.02937  3.4  20.36  10.57 
 
0.02000 6.5  73.95  7.20 
5  Score  00-06 reading 48  0.03580  1.4  21.75  12.89 
 
0.04030 1.9  70.32  14.51 
6  Score  00-06 math 48  0.02606  34.6  24.77  9.38 
 
0.08620 0.5  74.31  31.03 
7  Bot5%  00-06 math/reading 96 0.04349 3.2  2.18  15.66 
 
0.03038 6.0  62.59  10.94 
8  Bot10%c  00-06 math/reading 96 0.04151 2.1  6.66  14.94 
 
0.02736 4.6  67.66  9.85 
9  Top10%  00-06 math/reading 96 0.02692 4.0  40.84  9.69 
 
0.02265 10.0  60.59  8.15 
 
10  Top5%  00-06 math/reading 96 0.02137  11.5 42.76  7.69 
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Table A.7. OECD PISA test scores in math (06) and reading (06/09): [international standard deviation units] 
 
Reading 2006  Math 2006  Reading 2009 
Korea 556  
Finland 547 
Canada 527  
New Zealand 521  
Irland 517 
Australia 513  
Poland 508  
Sweden 507  
Netherlands 507  
Belgium 501  
Switzerland 499  
Japan 498  
United Kingdom 495  
Germany495  
Denmark 494 
Austria 490  
France 488  
Iceland 484  
Norway 484  
Czech Republic 483  
Hungary 482  
Luxembourg 479  
Portugal 472  
Italy 469  
Slovak Republic 466 
Spain 461  
Greece 460  
Turkey 447 
Mexico 410 
OECD Mean 492 
Finland 548 
Korea 547  
Netherlands 531  
Switzerland 530  
Canada 527 
Japan 523 
New Zealand 522  
Belgium 520  
Australia 520  
Denmark 513 
Czech Republic 510 
Iceland 506  
Austria 505  
Germany 504  
Sweden 502  
Irland 501 
France 496 
United Kingdom 495 
Poland495 







Italy 462  
Greece 459 
Turkey 424 
Mexico 406  
OECD Mean 498 




Japan 520  
Australia 515 
Netherlands 508  
Belgium 506  
Norway 503 
Estonia 501 
Switzerland 501  
Poland 500  
Iceland 500  
United States 500 
Sweden 497 
Germany 497 
Ireland 496  
France 496 
Denmark 495  
United Kingdom 494 
Hungary 494  
Portugal 489 
Italy 486  
Slovenia 483  
Greece 483  
Spain 481  
Czech Republic 478  
Slovak Republic 477 
Israel 474  
Luxembourg 472  
Austria 470  
Turkey 464  
Chile 449  
Mexico 425 
OECD average 493 
 
EBA REBA 
) 1 . 0 (    

















Debt  -3.386 -1.050  -2.382 -1.438  -2.236  -2.177  0.272  1.000 
Dens  -4.208 8.247  -0.299 7.084  -1.773  2.771  1.379  0.9777 
Disp  -4.208 8.247  -3.007 0.130  -0.288  -1.080  0.637  0.9550 
Unemp  -3.563 0.451  -2.370 -0.337  -1.634  -0.960  0.283  0.9997 
G9  -12.263 6.595 -7.193 -4.118  -5.770  -5.736  2.652  0.9847 
East  -32.878 15.607  -17.570 -3.073  -8.931  -9.346  2.615  0.9998 
CS2  -2.605 1.817  -1.661 -0.666  -0.335  -1.223  0.596  0.9799 






  Score (S)  Federal state-mean score of test subject mathematics and 
reading; high school ninth graders: OECD PISA-E 00/03/06, 
   2009:  Ländervergleich, OECD PISA (reading only) 
 
  BotX%  State-mean score of bottom-X% of students; subjects: math 
and reading; high school ninth graders: PISA-E 00/03/06, 
   2009:  Ländervergleich, OECD PISA (reading only) 
 
  TopX%  State-mean score of top-X% of students; subjects: math and 
reading; high school ninth graders: PISA-E 00/03/06, 
   2009:  Ländervergleich, OECD PISA (reading only) 
 
Explanatory Variables (in alphabetical order) 
 
  CIT  Cumulative instructional time of PISA-E cohorts 00/03/06 
for math and reading, respectively; Ländervergleich 2009 for 
reading; aggregated curricular hours (see Section 2.1) 
 
  City  Dummy = 1, if city-state (Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg) 
 
  Cons  Election result of CDU/CSU (conservative parties), federal 
election preceding respective test, Source: State parliaments 
 
  CS1  State-mean of class size in elementary schools, respective 
test year, Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 
 
  CS2  State-mean of class size in secondary I (Gymnasium), 
respective test year, Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 
 
 Debt  State-public-indebtedness per inhabitant in respective test 
year, 1,000 Euros, Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 
 
  Dens  State-population per square-kilometre (km²) in respective 
test year, Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 
 
 Disp  State-disposable-income per inhabitant in respective test 
year, 1,000 Euros, Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 
 
  East  Dummy = 1, if East-German state ( Neue Bundesländer) 
 
 Fee  Last cohort of state experiencing secondary school fees, birth 
year, Source: Riphahn (2011) 
 
 Fee2  First cohort of state after abolishment of secondary school 
fees, birth year, Source: Riphahn (2011) 
 
  Fem  State-employment-rate of females in respective test year, 
percent, Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 
 
 For  Foreigner share of state-population in respective test year, 
percent, Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 
 
 G9  Dummy = 1, if no. secondary school years to final grade =  9 
in respective test year, Source: Kultusministerkonferenz, 
www.kmk.org (see Section 3.2) 
   29
  GDP  Gross domestic state-product per inhabitant in respective test 
year, 1,000 Euros, Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 
 
  HT1  State-mean of hours per teacher in elementary schools, 
respective test year, Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 
 
  HT2  State-mean of hours per teacher in secondary I in respective 
test year, Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 
 
  Mig  State-share of 15 years old students with migration back-
ground in respective test year, Source: Baumert (2002), 
Prenzel et al. (2005, 2008), Köller et al. (2010) 
 
  PT1  State-share of part-time teachers in elementary schools in 
respective test year, Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 
 
  PT2  State-share of part-time teachers in secondary schools in 
respective test year, Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 
 
  Seg  State-share of 15 years old students attending high school 
(Gymnasium) in respective test year, Source: Baumert 
(2002), Prenzel et al. (2005, 2008), Köller et al. (2010) 
 
  ST1  State-mean of student-teacher-ratio in elementary schools in 
respective test year, Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 
 
  ST2  State-mean of student-teacher-ratio in secondary I (Gymna-
sium), respective test year, Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 
 
  Unemp  State-unemployment-rate in respective test year, percent, 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































30 Idiosyncratic potential determinants of student achievement in Germany
(a) Path-dependent and institutional variables
Segregation. It is straightforward to assume a negative relationship between the relative
share of a cohort of ninth graders attending high school (in Germany Gymnasium) and
the average PISA-test score of this group of students (Baumert 2002, p. 92, 124, 141).
As a smaller proportion might reach better learning outcomes, the selection of these
students (those attending Gymnasium) might matter. Ultimately, a negative relationship
might indicate future academics being educated and promoted better in smaller groups.
Undesirable side e⁄ects are social disparities and inequity (Hoxby 2000).
Family background and path dependency. The historical time of abolishment of secondary
school fees at the federal state level in Germany can be seen as a path-dependent de-
terminant of student achievement. It is immanent to the respective schooling system.
For example, the state of Rhineland-Palatinate (RP) continued to raise tuition fees for
secondary education up to two decades after world war II. According to the estimates of
Riphahn (2011), the abolishment of these fees has increased secondary school attendance
by about six percent. The positive enrollment e⁄ect is found to have been particularly
pronounced for female students. This ￿nding suggests two lines of reasoning. First, fam-
ilies with a lower social status were able to send their children to secondary school after
the abolishment of fees. Ninth-graders of the PISA-test cohorts 2000, 2003, 2006, and
2009 may have parents or grandparents who were able to attain a high school degree after
abolishment of fees. A corresponding generation of parents or grandparents from another
state, however, may not have had this chance due to fees and hence may not have started
a tradition of higher education (￿rst-cohort-without e⁄ect). Secondly, the awareness of
costs related to secondary education witnessed by the last birth cohort who paid fees
might matter for today￿ s students￿work ethic as this awareness might have been passed
on to next generations (last-cohort-with e⁄ect). For a recent theoretical rationalization
of both arguments see Doepke and Zilibotti (2008).
(b) Political economy factors
Conservative party e⁄ects. Post-war Germany witnessed a four-party and as of German
uni￿cation a ￿ve-party representative democracy with two dominating parties: the con-
servative Christian Democratic Union (in the state of Bavaria, BY: the Christian Social
Union) and the left-of-center social democrats (SPD). Party platforms di⁄er in their
education policy programs at the state-level.
(c) Socio-demographic framework
Socio-demographic conditions. Some authors ￿nd for German states a signi￿cant positive
impact of population density on the general support of education in a federal state (B￿t-
tner et al. 2004). Thus, density might proxy a pro-education environment with regard to
public spending. On the other hand, particularly urbanized, densely populated regions
typically attract immigrants bearing potential adverse e⁄ects on learning outcomes. This
might be due to non-native speakers requiring a higher teaching intensity.
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